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Abstract 
This paper fits into the ex-post migration cri-
sis of 2015-16 dialogue and offers added value 
through its complex transboundary perspective 
while bringing in the national perspective of a 
transboundary crisis. After the largest migration 
flow, lacking supranational coordination and go-
vernance, Slovenia’s coping strategy was orien-
ted towards logistical mechanisms to keep up the 
pressure and move the flow forward. Given the 
scale of the crisis, such a setting lacked a rapid 
response at the local level, and the high dimen-
sionality and nonlinear interactions caused pink 
noise. Using a case study method, the paper ar-
gues that crisis management moved backwards 
and had a decoupled structure. It also calls for 
a more inclusive multi-level crisis management 
structure and investment in existing international 
organizations. Indeed, if the crisis interactions 
had taken place globally, the crisis would be less 
dimensional and more linear, thus avoiding pink 
noise.
Keywords: public administration, crisis ma-
nagement, migrations, Slovenia
1. INTRODUCTION
In the period following 2015, European
countries began to face one of the biggest 
challenges in history, namely the increas-
ing influx of migrants. Data from Frontex 
(2018) show that in the three years, from 
2015 to 2017, some 2.5 million illegal bor-
der crossings were detected in the EU. The 
migrants used different routes, mostly along 
the southern and south-eastern part of the 
continent - according to Frontex (2017), 
there were (and still are) eight main ac-
tive migration routes. One of these routes 
is the so-called Western Balkans migration 
route, which was created in 2015, mainly 
because of the migrant flow on the Eastern 
Mediterranean route (Frontex, 2016) and 
was composed mainly of Syria and Afghan 
nationals (Frontex, 2015). 
Slovenia became the country on this 
route, as it was diverted after the Hungarian 
border was closed in the summer of 2015. 
Afterwards, the migrant wave shifted from 
Serbia to Croatia, then to Slovenia and 
from there to Austria and Germany. This 
transit route started in Turkey, continuing 
through Greece and Macedonia to Serbia 
(BBC News, 2015), but the Hungarian 
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border closure later diverted the flow to 
Slovenia. This flow started in September 
2015 and was stopped in March 2016. This 
was a result of the EU-Turkey agreement, 
which resulted in the official closure of the 
Western Balkans route until then (European 
Commission, 2016). 
The specificity of this flow is its scale, 
as about 0.5 million individuals have mi-
grated through Slovenia in this 6-month 
period, which can be determined relatively 
accurately, based on the above-mentioned 
figures on illegal border crossings in the 
EU. Out of the total migration flow, only 
around 500 individuals applied for in-
ternational protection (Eurostat, 2016). 
Moreover, not only the scale but also the 
nature of the migration was quite spe-
cific, as it was almost completely un-
controlled, which caused an enormous 
administrative burden for the countries, af-
fected by this route. Those were mainly due 
to the problems in implementing the Dublin 
Convention (see e. g. Trauner, 2016). 
Indeed, the political circumvention of this 
route by some Member States in 2015 was 
the main trigger, reinforcing one of the pull 
factors of migration to the destination coun-
tries in the Western and Northern Europe, 
where the countries on the Western Balkans 
route were only transit countries. 
This paper focuses on the analysis and 
evaluation of decoupled policy-making and 
the layering of actions and decision-making 
at all levels of government during the mi-
gration crisis. The existing literature, fo-
cusing on organizational research, has long 
been interested in crises and crisis manage-
ment, and this paper intends to add to this 
field of study, by focusing on the example 
of transboundary crisis, where governments 
and different layers of governance are in-
volved. As crises are infrequent events, we 
follow the common logic of the descriptive 
and prescriptive approach. We utilize the 
configurational approach and focus on crisis 
outcomes as a combination of factors shap-
ing it (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Bundy et al, 
2017).  
The value-added of the research is 
mitigating migration crisis from the com-
plexity perspective and focusing on the 
national perspective of a transboundary 
crisis. Previous research has pointed to the 
failure of multi-level governance (Rijavec 
& Pevcin, 2018), but it has not assessed 
why and how stratification and decoupling 
of policy and decision-making occurred 
in the management of the migration crisis, 
which in its scope is a transboundary cri-
sis (Boin, 2019; Rijavec & Pevcin, 2018). 
Furthermore, the existing literature has ad-
dressed the necessity to analyse single cri-
ses, measures used and impacts evolved 
(Filipović et al, 2018). 
Thus, the present research aims to 
bridge these gaps. In this context, the analy-
sis has its practical reasons, i.e. to involve 
also subnational level, limited to Slovenia 
as a transit country for migrants on the 
Western Balkans route, and the focus is on 
the developments during the six months, 
from October 2015 to March 2016, when 
the crisis was at its peak (OECD, 2017). 
This limitation still enables generalization 
of results obtained, as the hierarchical gov-
ernance structure is addressed; at the same 




In the contemporary discontinuity sys-
tems and continuous change-driven or-
ganizations, crises are more norms, rather 
than exceptions, leading to actors’ and 
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stakeholders’ preparedness necessarily at a 
high level in any crisis management phase. 
Furthermore, the nature of interactions be-
tween causal factors and dimensionality 
of casual systems have changed over the 
years, becoming much more complex. Their 
complexity comes with an increased num-
ber of interactions, causing high dimension-
al systems and changed interactions that 
are changing the known, or anticipated lin-
ear structure (Dooley & Van de Ven, 1999), 
causing tensions with unalike subsystems 
(Zahariadis, 2012). Furthermore, contem-
porary complex crises tend to fail with the 
linear cause-and-effect approach as they are 
too rigid and fail to adapt to the constantly 
changing system, sensitive to the internal 
and external conditions (Dooley & Van de 
Ven, 1999).  
Specifically, when addressing the cri-
sis management of public administration, 
one must acknowledge also the prevailing 
fundamental values of public administra-
tion, i.e. rationality and efficiency. This re-
flects the situation that crisis management 
is bound within a rather inflexible system, 
strongly based on Weber’s theory. Acute 
crises require different management, plan-
ning, leadership, training, etc. Therefore, 
the success of crisis management depends 
more on the individual innovation of the ac-
tors or stakeholders, rather than on system 
innovation. Therefore, innovation lies in the 
ability to maintain parallel environments 
of efficiency and flexibility (Stark, 2011; 
Stark, 2014; Boin & van Eeten, 2013). 
The response to an occurring crisis is 
normally a subsystem of an administrative 
level or entity, seen as a complex system 
with different actors, and boundaries are not 
clearly defined. Such a transboundary ap-
proach usually helps to understand the con-
temporary global threat of complex trans-
boundary crisis, which by nature surpass 
geographical, policy, public-private, cultur-
al, legal and other existing boundaries and 
bring uncertainty to decision-makers. The 
transboundary settling of a crisis shows that 
the existing domestic political-administra-
tive crisis settling is not enough. Regardless 
of the transboundary shape and type, they 
come in, they tend to share multiple do-
mains and multiple manifestations, among 
many national levels, where it is usually 
impossible to define a single geographical 
location. Such is even more intense as mul-
tiple actors with conflicting responsibili-
ties are included and their responsibilities 
and boundaries among them are not clear 
so decision-makers lack ready-made solu-
tions (Boin, 2019). When a crisis exceeds 
either national or policy-domain bounda-
ries, the general questions become hard to 
answer and deliver more substantial chal-
lenges to crisis management, such as crisis 
sense-making, coordination and legitimacy 
(Ansell et al, 2010). 
Dooley and Van de Ven (1999) defined 
such instances as “pink noise” when there is 
a high dimensionality of casual systems, but 
the interactions between causal factors are 
nonlinear. An example of such behaviour is 
a transboundary crisis. An interesting fea-
ture of such behaviour is entity’s constraints 
occurring locally rather than globally mean-
ing that all the included entities interde-
pendently influence each other. Namely, 
if they would occur globally, the system 
would be less dimensional and, hence, pink 
noise would not occur.  
Challenges of the transboundary cri-
ses tend to lie in the boundaries of polit-
ical-administrative entities that are struc-
tured around expertise areas and authority. 
Hence, we can either negotiate or transcend 
them by using two mechanisms of coordi-
nation or centralisation of emergency pow-
ers.  However, they both present a challenge 
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with transboundary crises. Namely, it is 
difficult to coordinate or negotiate the own-
ership, if it is not clear who the critical ac-
tors are or should be and what their role is. 
Furthermore, transcending boundaries and 
centralising authority also seem impossible 
as the roles cannot be defined. In the trans-
boundary crisis, a single state under crisis 
is usually not the actor, hence, the theory 
would suggest centralising at the suprana-
tional level. Yet, centralising on the level 
of international institutions is often not an 
option as they do not possess the power 
for decision-making and can generally cre-
ate weakness and legitimacy issues (Boin, 
2019). 
Given the boundary challenges, re-
searchers suggest two options to prepare 
and react to transboundary crises: decou-
pling (Perrow, 1984) or building resilience 
through trial-and-error strategy (Turner, 
1978). By applying the former, the system 
moves back to the simplified system, nor-
mally separated from another environment. 
Such insulation and entrenchment mean 
decoupling from the benefits of the other 
system. On contrary, by applying the lat-
ter, the system moves forward and prepares 
for an effective response, starting from the 
point that citizens know what is good for 
them and, hence, leaders should demand 
resilience (Boin, 2019). The network model 
implies that power is distributed among the 
ties between entities, pulling them together 
by the strength of a single tie, determined 
by the compatibility among entities. Given 
the possibility of risk, leaders should de-
tect vulnerabilities, build transboundary 
sense-making and establish transboundary 
decision-making systems (Boin et al, 2016). 
Further policy recommendations for tack-
ling problems include boosting analytical 
and political capacities. Analytical capaci-
ties can be enhanced by individual train-
ing, introducing strategic organizational 
units on the supranational or systemwide 
levels and then introducing certain road-
maps. Boosting political capacities can be 
achieved by individual interdepartmental 
rotations with the aim of competence de-
velopment, the inclusion of other horizontal 
organizations, such as non-governmental 
organizations, and other alternative episte-
mologies (Hartley et al, 2019). 
The crisis cycle changes and circum-
stances are often additionally challenged by 
the crisis complexity resulting from globali-
sation and the highly transnational reach. 
Since today’s crises are typically large-scale 
and involve multiple actors and stakehold-
ers, many vital systems are threatened si-
multaneously (Rosenthal, 2003; Fleischer, 
2013). Moreover, the complexity often en-
compasses cross-border issues requiring 
international cooperation, sometimes as a 
transnational public good (Rhinard, 2009), 
ensuring common capacities, regardless 
of space. Given the complexity, the prac-
tice tends to centralise crisis management 
operations to provide clarity, but in real-
ity, it provides weak and limited operations 
(Zahariadis, 2013).
Instead, decentralised operations with 
multi-level governance should take over. 
Such an arrangement attempts to create 
the basis for networked functioning of the 
various levels of government by achieving 
the dispersion of authority away from the 
national level, either horizontally to supra-
national and subnational actors, or verti-
cally to non-state actors because of a cen-
trifugal process (Marks, 1993; Hooghe & 
Marks 2003). The concept that explains the 
changing attitudes and participation of ac-
tors at different levels was first developed 
in the context of a study on EU cohesion 
policy and later used in the EU decision-
making process (Bache, 2005) as a result 
of two processes - Europeanisation and 
85
Management, Vol. 26, 2021, Special Issue, pp. 81-99
D. Rijavec, P. Pevcin: THE ANALYSIS OF A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CRISIS SITUATION: ...
regionalism (Hooghe, 1996). Based on in-
ductive reasoning, many studies followed, 
exploring EU integration theories and 
why EU’s issues were treated as domestic 
rather than international policy (Ongaro 
et al, 2019). Following the theory-build-
ing process, studies on this model can be 
summarised as an equal and interdepend-
ent network of actors based on a transpar-
ent dialogue that is usually not influenced 
by external factors and spatial differences 
(Stephenson, 2013). The model has been 
applied to several issues ranging from poli-
tics to policy-making or the reorganisation 
of the state, which, by definition, require 
more than two levels of government to in-
fluence joint decision-making towards a 
governance approach (Ongaro et al, 2019), 
with a binding commitment of actors that 
are politically independent but otherwise in-
terdependent at different levels (Schmitter, 
2004). 
Given the challenges that transbound-
ary crises pose, national levels are forced 
into transboundary collaboration with other 
systems and collectively tackle the crisis. 
Usually, that means centralising on an up-
per administrative or political level. The EU 
is a good example of that, as supranational 
institutions usually lack power in the inter-
national scope, as the EU still has subsidi-
ary power and competencies over certain 
sectors, combining both elements of gov-
ernance and government.  However, the EU 
administrative backbone follows multi-level 
governance that follows cooperation among 
different levels in a non-hierarchical setting. 
Also, the Solidary Clause of the Lisbon 
Treaty asks for joint action and assistance in 
event of crises. Furthermore, the European 
Disaster Response Capacity and Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
are building their power within and out-
side of the EU borders. Recently, the EU 
is tackling preparation for transboundary 
crises by developing generic and sectoral 
capacities. The first aims to reach common 
awareness and joint decision-making, such 
as establishing the EU Crisis Coordination 
Arrangements (CCA) or ARGUS. The sec-
ond aims to entrust smaller networked clus-
ters and EU agencies (Ansell et al, 2010). 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The case of the migration crisis 2015/16 
on the Western Balkans route serves as a 
basis for research that takes Slovenia and 
related governance issues into account. The 
events of 2015 and 2016 showed that the 
system was not able to solve the continu-
ous migration crisis (Rijavec and Pevcin, 
2018; Pevcin and Rijavec, 2021; Grigonis, 
2016). Indeed, previous research has shown 
that multi-level governance was not suc-
cessful in the case of the migration crisis of 
2015/16 on the Western Balkans route (see 
Rijavec & Pevcin, 2018), partly because a 
rigid type 1 governance prevailed when 
we follow the classification of multi-level 
governance by Hooghe and Marks (2003). 
Previous research has explicitly pointed to 
the lack of a common response to the cri-
sis and building resilience on the suprana-
tional level. This harmed the management 
of the crisis itself and, in addition, the status 
of the Union as a whole (Grigonis, 2016; 
Pevcin and Rijavec, 2021). Indeed, it led to 
tensions between the actors and called into 
question the very foundations of the exist-
ence of the Union and the Schengen area. 
The lack of cooperation and transparent 
dialogue has led to the decoupled formation 
of smaller clusters of countries with simi-
lar political positions and interests, which 
is contrary to the idea of EU integration 
(Evropska komisija, 2015).
Subsequently, we aim to assess the de-
gree of policy layering and decoupling in 
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the event of a migration crisis in 2015/16. 
Decoupling is, in fact, a possible govern-
ance configuration in a multi-level system 
in which either vertical relationships are 
missing or policy in a single policy area is 
dissociated and sometimes even contradic-
tory, leading to policy conflicts and reduced 
policy effectiveness (Scholten, 2016). This 
policy layering and decoupling has already 
been addressed in the literature on EU ag-
ricultural policy, especially after the 2003 
reform (see Viaggi et al, 2010; Daugbjerg & 
Swinbank, 2016), and more recently in the 
integration of migrants, where deviations 
of local integration policies compared to 
national policies can be observed (see e.g. 
Scholten, 2018). Since previous research 
on the migration crisis has highlighted 
problems of multi-level governance, this 
research will examine the extent to which 
policy-making is decoupled between differ-
ent levels of government and how this has 
led to stratification of policy-making and its 
implementation.
The analysis in this paper follows the 
logic of observational study, i.e. non-exper-
imental research, in which we focus on the 
analysis of outcomes and attributes leading 
to them. We neither get involved with the 
observed units nor do we control for the 
effects of secondary variables. Instead, we 
focus on revealing potentially important 
associations, intending to build knowledge 
as evidence for public policy (National 
Research Council, 2012). In essence, we are 
utilizing mainly exploratory research, as we 
are investigating a problem that is not clear-
ly defined and we, thus, want to provide a 
better understanding of it. The expected 
output is to identify issues that can serve 
as input for future research, related to crisis 
management (Babbie, 2007).
The data were collected from primary 
and secondary literature. This study uses 
the majority of the data coming directly 
from the actors involved, policy reports, 
memos or from journalistic reports on the 
subject. The interpretation of the results has 
been developed mainly based on the case 
study approach to assess the main question 
of the research, i.e. the decoupling and lay-
ering in policymaking while addressing the 
migration crisis in Slovenia. Layering is 
also being used to illustrate how each level 
coped individually with the situation and 
how the concept of multi-level governance 
was not fully applied. In addition, policy-
making was developed separately, at differ-
ent levels, without mutual negotiations. The 
presentation of the layering was based on a 
detailed examination of the measures, taken 
by each level. Three levels were consid-
ered: supranational, national and subnation-
al level. The supranational level is the EU 
level, the national level is the central gov-
ernment of Slovenia, and the subnational 
level is related to Slovenian municipalities, 
as the only tier of subnational governance. 
The study is limited to the period under 
review, i.e. the peak of the migration crisis 
in Slovenia in 2015/16, and does not in-
clude measures or policies introduced after 
that date, as they were not essential for co-
ordinating the influx. Some policies intro-
duced by supranational and national levels 
before the period under study are presented 
in the results, as their creation was essen-
tial or at least was intended to contribute 
to the effectiveness of crisis management. 
Moreover, the research focuses mainly on 
the vertical dispersion between levels and 
does not take into account the horizontal 
one with non-state actors. The top-down ap-
proach was mainly investigated as the most 
active direction through the use of hierar-
chical governance.
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Due to the lack of coordination and co-
operation resulting from the specific po-
litical conditions, peculiarities and interests, 
the emerging crisis lacked a rapid and ho-
listic strategy with close cooperation at all 
levels. Therefore, it began to structure itself 
as a layered structure for policy-making and 
decision-making. Since the migration crisis 
was essentially a European problem, sev-
eral actions were taken at the EU (suprana-
tional) level, some to resolve the crisis, oth-
ers to maintain existing support programs. 
Two groups of actions could be highlight-
ed: the first took place between April and 
September 2015, the second from February 
2016 onwards; the first group of actions 
also included a strategic document entitled 
“European agenda on migration”, includ-
ing short and long-term solutions (European 
Commission, 2015). The second set of ac-
tions aimed at implementing the EU Turkey 
Joint Action Plan where an agreement 
was reached in March 2016 (European 
Commission 2016). 
The first actions were not directly rele-
vant for the Slovenian national level, as the 
support seemed to be mainly focused on the 
Member States most affected, the so-called 
frontline countries, and actions to find so-
lutions with third countries (European 
Commission, 2015; Thielemann, 2017). 
Yet, the second action had a major im-
pact on Slovenia and the crisis as a whole, 
as it also led to the closure of the Western 
Balkans Route and, thus, to the limitation of 
the influx of migrants in Slovenia.
When the EU withdrew its potential to 
solve the crisis, crisis management was 
transferred to member states, with lim-
ited support and guidance from the EU 
level causing pink noise on the local level. 
Dysfunctionalities of the system, especially 
at the supranational level, were intensely 
problematic at Common European Asylum 
System, as the crisis revealed a false un-
derstanding of the entire system (Niemann 
and Speyer, 2017). In addition to the fail-
ure of the Dublin Regulation, Temporary 
Protection Directive tried to be activated 
holistically with the common intention of 
protecting migrants in the event of a mass 
influx, based on solidarity (Bačić Selanec, 
2015). In the absence of a reaction from the 
supranational level, the decentralisation of 
policy-making has begun. As a result, the 
influential member states gained strength 
and sought alternative courses of action 
based on the Geneva Conventions and con-
cerning their political characteristics and 
national interests (Bačić Selanec, 2015). 
Asymmetric management proved detrimen-
tal for fast and efficient crisis resolution 
and the holistic integration of the Common 
European Asylum System.
The German policy of open borders and 
“asylum shopping”, as referred by Niemann 
and Speyer (2017), led to direct Slovenian 
participation as a transit country, where the 
national government gathered a high de-
gree of bundling power. Given its tempo-
rary nature, the national level tried to use 
its centralised strength to optimise border 
control, reception and accommodation and 
to promote flow. In this context, measures 
were defined in line with the solidarity re-
sponse, including the standards for proce-
dures for granting international protection 
and rights and obligations requested (Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia (RS) 
no. 22/2016), which was carried out as a 
legislative amendment to the International 
Protection Act. The national level was seen 
as a credible partner in the response to the 
crisis. However, in preparing for the influx, 
the national government failed to develop 
crisis management, which had undesir-
able consequences. An example of this was 
the contingency plan that was introduced, 
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which provided for a system of accommoda-
tion and care in the event of a large number 
of asylum seekers (Republic of Slovenia, 
Government of the RS, 2015). The document 
was well prepared just before the influx of 
migrants but was rather irrelevant as there 
were hardly any asylum seekers in Slovenia. 
This is evident also from the table below, 
which indicates that the vast majority of mi-
grants that entered the country left it very 
soon. This is reflected also in the data on 
applications for granting asylum and inter-
national protection. During the period from 
September 2015 to June 2016, only 733 such 
applications were filed in Slovenia (Pristavec 
Đogić & Križaj, 2016).
Table 1. Migrants entering and exiting Slovenia (2015-16)
Period Number of migrants entering Number of migrants exiting
October 15-31, 2015 116,627 98,981
November 2015 164,313 170,387
December 2015 96,607 96,575
January 2016 62,785 62,796
February 2016 34,795 33,666
March 1-8, 2016 1,607 1,528
Source: Pristavec Đogić & Križaj (2016).
Consequently, the protection of the 
external Schengen border was one of 
Slovenia’s priorities. As a result of border 
control, two focal points of individual na-
tional activities can be highlighted during 
the period under study. The first was the 
reintroduction of temporary border control 
at the internal land border with Hungary1 
following Article 25 et seq. of Schengen 
Borders Code (European Commission, 
2018). The second was the installation 
of temporary technical barriers at the 
Schengen external border with Croatia2, 
which was introduced in November 2015. 
The 150-kilometre long wire was intend-
ed to prevent the dispersal of migrants’ 
entry points, while the border remained 
1 Twice, between 17 - 26 September 2015 and between 
27 September – 16 October 2015, grounded on the 
prevention on spread uncontrolled entry points be-
fore the official redirection of the migrant flow to 
Slovenia.  
2 While both countries, Croatia and Slovenia, are EU 
members, only Slovenia is a member of Schengen 
Zone, thus being in charge for Schengen border 
checks.
open (Republic of Slovenia, Government 
of the RS, 2015a). Both measures were 
Slovenian initiatives and did not sup-
port the standard Schengen idea, but both 
were also supported by the supranation-
al level (European Commission, 2015a; 
STA, 2015), as member states are free 
to use their border control instruments. 
Nevertheless, the activities caused unin-
tended side effects. Specifically, the fenc-
ing harmed the environment, especially on 
wildlife and tourism, and the subnational 
level wastefully applied for compensa-
tion at the national level for any dam-
age or costs incurred (The Association 
of Municipalities of Slovenia, 2015), or 
even for full reimbursement (Republic 
of Slovenia, Ministry of Defence, 
Administration of the RS for Civil 
Protection and Disaster Relief, 2015). This 
was followed by a protest rally and a civil 
society petition which, interestingly, put 
aside the general attitude towards migra-
tion at the subnational level and showed 
disagreement, especially on environmental 
89
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protection3 (Prava peticija 2017; E-utrip, 
2015).
In addition to the actual physical bor-
der control, the lack of resources posed a 
serious threat to national security and crisis 
management. When migrants were allowed 
to enter the country, various stakehold-
ers were involved, but there was a lack of 
human resources in providing extensive 
support. The lack of police personnel be-
gan to pose a serious threat to national se-
curity, and several measures were taken 
to limit this possibility. By amending the 
Organization and Work of the Police Act 
and the Defence Act, the provision of ad-
ditional support to Slovenian Police has 
been provided4 (Official Gazette of the RS 
no. 86/15; Official Gazette of the RS no. 
95/15). In addition, the national level also 
requested additional support from several 
actors at the horizontal level5. In addition, 
international assistance was requested to 
strengthen local police forces, mainly from 
other member states, thus overriding sup-
port at the supranational level. This means 
that about 500 to 1,000 police officers and 
affiliate personnel support border controls 
daily (STA, 2016). In contrast, the lack of 
staff in the registration and accommodation 
centres led to the failure of daily procedures 
and the appropriate care for the flows of 
3 Slovenian biodiversity is known to be above world’s 
average and any negative human intervention is 
highly criticised by competent authority and civil 
society.
4 One was allowing the activation of previously retired 
police officers and the other one was the activation of 
Slovenian Army for the police tasks and authoriza-
tions, under strictly defined conditions.
5 Military Officers Association of Slovenia, Veterans’ 
Association for the War of Slovenia, firefighters, 
auxiliary police officers and special police units spe-
cialised on crowds were utilized for help.
migrants. Two important national measures6 
were financial support and the provision of 
additional staff. In terms of staff support, 
several actors were involved in activating 
people at the national and subnational level. 
Public officials were called in to provide 
additional assistance concerning voluntary 
work in registration and accommodation 
centres, and additional jobs were created 
through the Public Works Programme. The 
administration of the Republic of Slovenia 
for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief and 
national units for civil protection joined 
forces to also provide official assistance in 
the reporting and accommodation centres 
(Pristavec Đogić & Križaj, 2016).
The lack of capacity could also have 
been observed in other areas, where the 
lack of accommodation capacity for new 
arrivals was by far the most worrying. In 
addressing the problem, the national level 
mainly provided a single response, with-
out the cooperation or support of other 
levels. On the one hand, the supranational 
level did not intervene in the accommoda-
tion system at the national level, and on the 
other hand, the subnational level was very 
critical and sometimes avoided coopera-
tion. For example, in February 2016, many 
protest rallies were organized at the subna-
tional level to avoid the construction of new 
accommodation centres in their vicinity 
(Dnevnik, 2016; Radiotelevizija Slovenija, 
2015a; 24ur, 2016; STA, 2016a), at a time 
when the national level had no more ca-
pacity and was looking for new possibili-
ties for centres. Hardly any municipalities 
were positively committed to the additional 
placement of centres in their ownership 
6 Support to reception capacities established to cope 
and manage the mass arrival of third-country nation-
als at the Slovenian Schengen border and Establish-
ing of new and facilitation of existing accommoda-
tion capacities to cope and manage the mass arrival 
of third-country nationals at the Slovenian Schengen 
border.
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(Rudman, 2015). Although the costs for mi-
gration management were later taken over 
by the national level (Republic of Slovenia, 
Ministry of Defence, Administration of the 
RS for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief, 
2015), the construction of accommodation 
centres in new locations in some munici-
palities had a very negative impact on pub-
lic discourse, mainly because of the general 
outset towards migrations.
The subnational level has not been re-
sponsible for additional policy decisions 
or activities that could contribute to solv-
ing the wider migration problem. Activities 
focused on supporting coordination in the 
reception and accommodation of migrants. 
Municipal authorities played an important 
role in meeting staffing needs and provid-
ing technical assistance.7 The subnational 
component of policy-making for migrants 
is reflected not just in the differences in the 
way crisis management was defined at na-
tional and the subnational levels, but also in 
how they interacted. In other words, there 
was mainly top-down coordination, and 
there was little interaction between the two 
levels, and bottom-up initiatives were rather 
limited, as only the municipalities most di-
rectly affected took action. One initiative, 
for example, was that of the Municipality 
of Brežice, a municipality on the exter-
nal Schengen border with Croatia, host-
ing four reception centres during the crisis. 
Municipality prepared the proposal on the 
requirements, related to the solution of the 
migrant crisis. This proposal was forward-
ed to the national level to influence poli-
cy-making and widen the scope of action 
for subnational policy. The requirements 
focused on preventing the dispersion of 
7 Various volunteers and employees participated in 
accommodation activities. In addition, municipali-
ties provided basic goods supplies, especially beds, 
clothing, footwear and hygiene items (Mestna občina 
Ljubljana, 2015).
entries and structuring them at one or two 
points of entry, preferably using the pos-
sibility of train transport, on the increased 
involvement of the participating stakehold-
ers, on an efficient flow of information and 
data exchange, and financial compensation 
for the costs and damages caused by the 
crisis (Municipality of Brežice, Municipal 
Council, 2015).
Namely, the negative side-effects of 
the migration crisis were observed mainly 
in the border municipalities located near 
the main entry point for migrants into the 
Schengen area. For example, in the munici-
pality of Brežice, this was reflected in the 
overall reduced quality of everyday life, as 
security measures increased, which was not 
considered beneficial for the inhabitants, 
and economic damage could also have been 
observed, especially concerning tourism 
(Municipality of Brežice, 2015). The local 
community tried to raise its voice, mainly 
through social media, to influence nation-
al decisions (Radiotelevizija Slovenija, 
2016a).
Tensions in multi-level governance were 
mainly related to the lack of discourse and 
the tendency of national governments to 
dominate policy-making. There was a lack 
of dialogue at the subnational level, and 
communication was mostly operational, i.e. 
the exchange of statistics on the influx of 
migrants. This was observed, for example, 
in the issue of the establishment of accom-
modation centres, where the subnational 
level stated that the national level did not 
provide complete information on the “en-
campment” in certain municipalities, and 
the national level showed disparities with 
local needs and perceptions (24ur, 2016).
The case study shows that weaknesses 
in overall crisis management were revealed 
during the influx of migrants, leading to 
tensions in multi-level governance and 
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causing “pink noise”. As Slovenia served 
mainly as a transit country8 on this Western 
Balkans route, national decision-making 
and policy-making at the national level tried 
to optimise border controls and registration 
of migrants, and, consequently, to direct 
the flow of migrants to its northern border 
with Austria as efficiently as possible, as the 
flow tried to reach the destination countries. 
Nevertheless, at the national level the main 
concern was maintaining and defending the 
external border of the Schengen area but, 
due to the country’s size, and the large scale 
of the crisis, there was a lack of resources 
to carry out this task efficiently. Starting 
from the issue of the lack of resources, 
the national level called for internation-
al support for European Civil Protection 
Mechanism. With the help of other mem-
ber states and international organisations, 
Slovenia received the necessary material, 
human, material, financial and health sup-
port (Republic of Slovenia, Government of 
the Republic of Slovenia, 2018). Despite 
the assistance received, it was clear that 
efficient crisis management requires joint 
action by institutions and diverse organi-
sations at all levels. Therefore, resilience 
building and sound multi-level governance 
are considered essential for the efficient 
management of the influx of migrants as 
this is a transboundary crisis.
Although many assurances were given 
that Slovenia had been prepared for the in-
flux of migrants, the situation had many 
shortcomings; the situation in neighbour-
ing countries was carefully monitored and a 
contingency plan was drawn up. It was later 
recognised that this was a circumvented 
document, as migrants were not interested 
8 Supported by the fact that only 280 (890) asylum 
applications were filled in Slovenia in 2015 (2016), 
according to the OECD (2017) data, although the 
country lies on the Schengen zone border and these 
two years were the peaks of the migrant crisis on the 
Western Balkan route. 
in applying for international protection, 
but merely in travelling through Slovenia 
and entering the destination countries in 
Western and Northern Europe. The findings 
also point to many ad hoc decisions and im-
provisations on the ground. For example, 
the national level tried to comply with su-
pranational guidelines and regulations but 
also wanted to follow the demands of the 
subnational level, which did not materialise 
as expected.
Several individual measures have been 
taken at the national level to alleviate the 
situation at the borders, with the strengthen-
ing of border controls being by far the most 
exemplary measure. The results portrayed 
indicate a rather passive supranational re-
sponse, but this was not just the case in 
the crisis on the Western Balkan migra-
tion route. The same was observed in the 
Italian sea and air operation Mare Nostrum 
(Ministero della Difesa, 2018; Centre for 
European Reform, 2015). The operation 
was an action at the national level to save 
the lives of migrants who tried to reach the 
EU, and supranational support came only 
after a few months, mostly in the form of 
financial aid (Ministero della Difesa, 2018).
Interestingly, there are existing agen-
cies on the EU level that were formed to 
tackle transboundary crises on the immigra-
tion issue, such as Frontex and European 
Migration Network (EMN) and similar in-
stitutions. Regardless of the existing agen-
cies on the EU level, we still lack the power 
to mitigate situations that cause pink noise. 
For example, we faced pink noise in the 
migration influx as a problem, which re-
quired supranational action, but this was 
left to the national levels. Theoretically, if 
the Common European Asylum System and 
Dublin regulation acted as stable guidelines 
and if they didn’t fail under the crisis pres-
sure, it would be possible to generate low 
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dimensionality and, hence, to avoid pink 
noise. 
Thus, the supranational level responded 
to the crisis with considerable delay, and 
it also failed to meet member states’ ex-
pectations in terms of providing adequate 
support and resources. The national level 
therefore rather decoupled and acted in-
dividually, based on their national poli-
cies, capabilities and national preferences. 
Namely, member states and even different 
levels of government within member states 
created several different policies to man-
age the crisis, i.e. asymmetric crisis man-
agement was observed. As crisis pressure 
increased, countries formed alliances with 
countries sharing similar problems and 
preferences, and some of them even pro-
moted policies that were not in line with 
the official European solidarity response 
(Bauerova, 2018).
It could be argued that action at the na-
tional level was justified, but not in line 
with the solidarity response. Nevertheless, 
some actors at the subnational level and 
civil society did not agree with this policy, 
as demonstrated by protest rallies and peti-
tions. Moreover, there was a clear lack of 
political decision-making at the subnational 
level, except in the communities directly af-
fected. The result of the lack of strategy and 
coordination between the different levels 
of government is the failure of multi-level 
governance. There was a lack of a holistic 
strategy to address the migrant crisis as a 
whole, which also led to a lack of clear task 
allocation. Since crisis management was 
conducted separately at different levels, 
there was also a lack of dialogue between 
the stakeholders. The lack of transparency 
in some actions slowed down cooperation 
between levels, making it even more dif-
ficult for some stakeholders to participate 
adequately in certain actions. For example, 
the lack of dialogue and cooperation be-
tween the national and subnational levels 
aggravated the already sensitive issue of the 
establishment of accommodation centres in 
selected municipalities. The situation led to 
the layering of action planning and policy-
making, rather than managing the situation 
through multi-level cooperation.
5. CONCLUSION
The results of the study indicate the fail-
ure of multi-level governance when man-
aging the migration crisis on the Western 
Balkans migrant route. This led to policy 
layering and decoupling, resulting in asym-
metric crisis management. Ultimately, the 
crisis response had been inadequate, and 
since this was a large-scale crisis nega-
tive implications were further amplified. 
Although policy layering might strengthen 
the position of some actors (stakeholders), 
this comes at the expense of others, which 
further hinders effective management. The 
discourse does not imply that any level was 
unwilling to contribute to solving the crisis; 
on the contrary, all levels tried to manage 
the migration crisis as efficiently as pos-
sible, but policy and decision-making were 
mostly stratified and decoupled. This was 
a direct consequence of the lack of vertical 
relationships and the inappropriate type of 
governance used to address this crisis, as 
well as the political stratification that led to 
decoupled policy-making, where policies 
were sometimes contradictory and conflicts 
arose between the levels.
The results present the lack of a ho-
listic strategy to tackle such transbound-
ary crisis and no clear task assignment for 
problem-solving. Furthermore, a lack of 
dialogue and transparency was observed. 
This could be partially attributed to the in-
appropriate way of governance that prevails 
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in EU decision-making. Unlike the stand-
ard practice, there should be a greater fo-
cus on task-specific actions and solutions, 
where decision-making powers would have 
been distributed horizontally and vertically 
across all levels by actors specifically fo-
cused on migration crisis management, thus 
contributing to policy effectiveness. This 
would require a more flexible EU architec-
ture in which decision-making processes 
are more nested between the different lev-
els of government, giving soft governance a 
greater role in deciding policies and proce-
dures.9 Namely, arrangements and process-
es that work reasonably well for “bounded” 
crises are unlikely to work in the case of 
transboundary crises, so national levels gen-
erally have two options, either decoupling 
or building resilience and pursuing transna-
tional crisis management strategy. The re-
sults of the research indicate the prevalence 
of the first option. 
Furthermore, we should invest more 
in existing international organizations and 
build transboundary crisis management 
institutions as they are supposed to bring 
swift solutions or at least clear coordination 
and guidance on the table, such as reengi-
neering, transformation, ad hoc processes 
and changes in the existing organisational 
culture. The institutional challenge, there-
fore, remains in building effective trans-
boundary systems for managing future 
complex transboundary crises. 
Although the analysis focused only on 
the one vertical structure of governance, 
i.e. Slovenia serving as an exemplification, 
this still enables some generalization of the 
challenges portrayed. Still, there is a recom-
mendation for future research that a similar 
approach is followed also in other coun-
tries, affected by such transboundary crises. 
9 More on the issue of softer governance in general, 
see: Cram (1997) and Tömmel (1994).
This involves not just migration crisis, 
where different challenges might arise with 
the destination countries, but also in situ-
ations where the crisis does not have very 
different impacts on the countries involved. 
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ANALIZA KRIZNE SITUACIJE U JAVNOJ UPRAVI: 
SLUČAJ MIGRACIJA U SLOVENIJI
Sažetak
U ovom se radu ex-post analizira i uklapa 
u dijalog o migrantskoj krizi 2015-16 godine, 
pri čemu se pruža nova vrijednost, utemeljena 
na kompleksnoj i interdisciplinarnoj perspekti-
vi, koja u obzir uzima i nacionalnu perspektivu 
globalne krize. Nakon najvećeg tijeka migracija, 
koji se odvijao bez međunarodne koordinacije i 
upravljanja procesom, slovenska strategija suo-
čavanja s problemom bila je orijentirana na lo-
gističke mehanizme, kojima se smanjivao pritisak 
i usmjeravao tijek migranata prema njihovom 
krajnjem cilju. S obzirom na opseg krize, nedo-
stajao je brzi odgovor na lokalnoj razini, a veći 
broj dimenzija i nelinearne interakcije unutar 
krizne situacije izazivali su smetnje u komunika-
ciji. Korištenjem metode studije slučaja, u ovom 
se radu utvrđuje da je došlo do povlačenja i ne-
koordiniranosti kriznog menadžmenta. Također 
se poziva na stvaranje inkluzivnije i višerazinske 
strukture kriznog menadžmenta i financiranje po-
stojećih međunarodnih organizacija. Štoviše, da 
su se krizne interakcije događale na globalnoj 
razini, krizna situacija bi imala manje dimenzija 
te bi se odvijala linearno, čime bi se izbjegle i 
smetnje u komunikaciji.
Ključne riječi: javna uprava, krizni menad-
žment, migracije, Slovenija
